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354 Beiträge
Jan Masschelein
Inciting an attentive experimental ethos and
creating a laboratory setting1
Philosophy of education and the transformation of educational institutions
Abstract: All over Europe educational institutions (school, family, university, youth care
etc.) are undergoing profound transformations. This paper explores on a more general
level of what it could mean to deal with them, to relate to them, and to take up the chal-
lenge they offer for philosophy of education. In order to do so, the paper first recalls how
HannahArendt in the preface to her book Between Past and Future entitled “The gap bet-
ween past and future”, describes her own philosophical work as “exercises in/of thought“
implying a particular gesture and stance in relation to what happens. To further indicate
what such exercises entail (what they actually are about) and what they require (in terms
of equipment and preparation) a concrete and topical example of such an exercise is pre-
sented: the cinema of the Belgian Dardenne Brothers. Then, finally, these exercises are
related to a proposal to create “laboratories”, to set up experiments, and to do a kind of
‘fieldwork’ in relation to the actual transformations of educational institutions.
1. Introduction
All over Europe educational institutions (school, family, university, youth care etc.) are
undergoing profound transformations. These are related to particular national and Euro-
pean policies (e.g. the Bologna process or the European Qualification Framework), but
also to changing social conditions, to the changing role and availability of knowledge,
to increasing migration, to the role of media, and to the revolutions in technology (ICT)
and science (e.g. neurosciences, life and learning sciences, …). I do not want to discuss
these transformations here in a direct way. Rather, what interests me is an exploration
on a more general level of what it could mean to deal with them, to relate to them, and
to take up the challenge they offer for philosophy of education.
A common way of relating to these transformations, which finds its roots in a long-
standing critical tradition, conceives of the practice of philosophy (of education) as a
kind of (supplementary) inquiry, which tries to understand, judge, and criticize the co-
herence, the values, the observations, the knowledge claims, the rationality, the aims,
the principles, reasons, and arguments that are present in the discourses and practices
1 The paper reports on thoughts developed in a permanent exchange and close cooperation
with Maarten Simons. It relies also on research made possible by funding from the “Research
Council” of the K. U. Leuven and by the Belgian “Fund for Scientific Research”. An earlier
and much shorter version was presented at a Conference in Basel in October 2009: Philos-
ophy of education and the transformation of educational systems. Sharon Todd (2009) offered
a thoughtful response to the paper, which is also taken into account.
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that these transformations entail.2 This critical tradition conceives of the work of philos-
ophy primarily as a work of judgment, ordering, justification, selection, concept clarifi-
cation, interpretation, or explication, which is “critical” in the sense that it is in one way
or another oriented towards validity claims (either ethical/normative or epistemologi-
cal). This means that it puts reality (e.g. educational research and theory, educational
policies and practices) to the test of its own thinking (theory, concepts, knowledge):
the test of argumentative logic, of interpretative procedures/criteria, of norms or princi-
ples (e.g. of theoretical, practical, communicative reason), of theoretical systems or phi-
losophies (either deductively or analytically constructed). Therefore its utterances and
writings, its “truth-telling”, claims a critical-judgmental role for (educational) research-
ers and scholars, which rests on taking a distance and detaching oneself from the real-
ity under scrutiny, a reality that is first of all regarded and experienced as an object of
knowledge. Consequently, its truth-telling aspires to be either a demonstration (teaching
something), or a judgment (separating between valid/not-valid; right/wrong, etc.), or a
de-mystification (revealing what is underlying or supposed i.e. denouncing illusions).
In a certain way, its writings and utterances are disciplined and given in an “addressed”
language: defining the public that lacks enlightenment, that is, the appropriate knowl-
edge (or the appropriate awareness, criteria, virtues…) (Walser, 2000, p. 135).
This critical tradition is an important one and clearly it has a role to play in dealing
with the actual transformations. However, I would like to pay attention to another, ad-
mittedly more marginal, tradition in philosophy, which we can call the ascetic (or ex-
istentially-oriented) tradition, which understands critique not in terms of judgment, but
in terms of an experiment and an exposition.3 In this tradition, the work of philosophy
is in the first place a work on the self i.e. putting oneself to the “test of contemporary
reality”, implying an enlightenment not of others but of one-self, but of one-self not as
subject of knowledge but as subject of action.4 This putting one-self to test is, therefore,
an exercise in the context of self-formation and self-education: it seeks to transform or
modify one’s own mode of being and how one lives in the present. This transformation
is, then, the condition for insight and knowledge (Foucault, 1984/2007, p. 114). This ex-
ercise implies not so much a judgmental ethos and a critical distance, but rather an “in-
timate” relationship and nearness related to an attentive and experimental ethos. In my
2 For some clear examples see a recent Special Issue of the Journal of Philosophy of Educa-
tion entitled “What do philosophers of education do? (And how do they do it?)” (Ruitenberg,
2009). We can find equivalent and similar formulations in the German and French contexts.
3 See Foucault (1984): “But if we are not to settle for the affirmation or the empty dream of
freedom, it seems to me that this historico-critical attitude must also be an experimental one.
I mean that this work done at the limits of ourselves must…put itself to the test of reality, of
contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to
determine the precise form this change should take” (p. 47).
4 In this traditionWittgenstein (1980) wrote: “Work in philosophy – like work in architecture in
many respects – is really more work on oneself. On one’s own conception. On one’s way of
seeing things. (And what one asks of it)” (p. 16). And Foucault (1986) famously called “phi-
losophy” “an exercise of oneself in the activity of thought” (p. 9). On Foucault see: McGushin
(2007).
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contribution I want to further specify this ethos by trying to articulate more clearly the
relation to contemporary reality and the kind of activities it implies. In order to do this,
I will (1) recall how Hannah Arendt in the preface to her book Between Past and Fu-
ture entitled “The gap between past and future”, describes her own philosophical work
as “exercises in/of thought” implying a particular gesture and stance in relation to what
happens. To further indicate what such exercises entail (what they actually are about)
and what they require (in terms of equipment and preparation) I will (2) present a con-
crete and topical example of such an exercise. Then, finally, (3) I will briefly relate these
exercises to a proposal to create “laboratories”, to set up experiments, and to do a kind
of ‘fieldwork’ in relation to the actual transformations of educational institutions.
2. Hannah Arendt: putting oneself to the test of contemporary reality,
or an “exercise in/of thought”
Arendt (1968) considers the work she offers in Between Past and Future to be “exer-
cises in thought”, containing criticism but being mainly “experiments” “arising out of
the actuality of incidents”, and having the form of “essays”. Most interesting to con-
sider here is how she elaborates on the space/time of these exercises, and states that the
“proper region of thought” is not the region that “Western metaphysics has dreamed [of]
from Parmenides to Hegel”: a “timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous realm” (p. 11). It is,
rather, what she calls the gap between past and future. But this gap, another name for
the present, as “an interval in time which is altogether determined by things that are no
longer and by things that are not yet” (p. 9), “is not the present as we usually understand
it”, as a point in a continuous “flow of uninterrupted succession” (p. 11) or in a “stream
of sheer change – which we can conceive of cyclically as well as in the form of rectilin-
ear motion” (Arendt, 1978, p. 203). Rather it is the present “due exclusively to the pres-
ence of man” (Arendt, 1968, p. 10) i.e. the insertion into time of “a beginning” (man as
acting being). The exercises of thought are concerned with the present, but the present
is not what appears as such and before us (as an object of knowledge). Rather, it is what
is experienced when we are attentive, when we are “present in the present” (attending to
the present, touched by it and touching it – where the relation between object-subject of
knowledge is suspended), when “we” are “there” i.e. we insert ourselves and thus also
expose ourselves to what is happening. That is to say that the present, as the gap where
these exercises take place, exists only in so far as man recognizes or experiences him/
herself as a beginner, as a subject of action, inserts him/herself in time, “splitting up
time in forces that work upon him/her” (p. 11; italics J. M.), but that are, thus, in a way
broken or interrupted in him/her (as beginning – where s/he stands).
So, the space/time of the exercise of thought – a space/time that is distinct from the
“ever-changing time-space which is created and limited by the forces of past and future”
(Arendt, 1968, p. 12; italics J. M.) – is the gap or present that “come[s] into being only
with his own, self-inserting appearance” (p. 12). The gap only exists when one is oneself
there, being attentive to the present, taking care of it, being concerned with it (which is
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not the same as knowing it). This means that the “exercise of thought” (i.e. philosophy
in this sense) is an exercise that is not oriented towards (or based on, or about) knowl-
edge in the first place, but concerns the issue of how to act and relate to the present,
whereby “only insofar [as] he thinks…does man in the full actuality of his concrete be-
ing live in this gap of time between past and future” (p. 13; italics J. M.). In that sense
the exercise of thought is not a jumping out of that present, but on the contrary “remains
bound to and is rooted in the present” (p. 12). Although Arendt claims that the one who
thinks is ageless (not part of – i.e. in no way determined by – a history or a biography),5
the time of thinking is not the time where one has jumped out of human affairs and is
“above the melée” (p. 12). It is no “timeless, spaceless, suprasensuous realm” (p. 11). It
is precisely the present that is the gap, and the way to live in this gap is thinking. Or bet-
ter, thinking is an activity immediately related to an existential question of how to live in
the present (Arendt writes that it is about “how to move in the gap”, p. 14). It has to do
with myself as a subject of (right) action i.e. a subject that takes care of the present and
of one’s presence in that present. The “exercise of thought” (which cannot be learned,
according toArendt, but has to be performed time and again) is a work on oneself not in
the first place as a subject of knowledge (knowledge is important but in relation to the
care for the self), but as one who experiences oneself as a beginner – somebody who is
“able to” act and speak, and to use the words of Jacques Rancière (2009), someone who
does not forget herself – “se souvient de soi” – suspending historical time (and historical
necessity), suspending biographical time (and psychological necessity), suspending so-
cial time (and sociological necessity) – i.e. ageless, as Arendt says, but at the same time
attached to the present, present in the present. Therefore thinking means: not to forget
oneself. Not to forget oneself as subject of action, as being an insertion in time, a begin-
ning through which the (historical, psychological, social…) forces work.
According to Arendt (1968), the gap between past and future (which has existed
since the presence of ‘men’) was previously bridged by tradition. But now tradition is
lost and no longer throws light on the future. There is still a past and even a heritage, but
without testament, without any authoritative or directive force, it is no longer operative
as tradition but has become instead an available resource. The present, then, has become
“a tangible reality and perplexity for all” (p. 14) urging for exercises of thought to see
“how to move in this gap” (p. 14). But it has also solicited all kinds of strategies to close
the gap, to ignore it, to avoid thinking as exposing oneself to the present, i.e. strategies
to immunize oneself against the fact that after tradition has been lost, one has to take
up the challenge to live a truly “human” life and to try the words (authority, freedom,
education,…) and verbs (living, loving, speaking,…) again. If we refuse to expose our-
selves to the present, being, as Arendt says, a battlefield of forces, rather than a home
(p. 13) and to recognize ourselves as acting, then there remains only the experience of
5 She states that in historical and biographical time there are no gaps: “Applied to historical or
biographical time, none of these metaphors can possibly make sense because gaps do not oc-
cur there” (Arendt, 1968, p. 13). That the one who thinks is ageless does not mean that s/he
has no past or future but that, in thinking, these forces are suspended i.e they are not absent
but temporarily prevented from being in force or effect.
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“sempiternal change of the world and the biological cycle of living creatures in it” –
things taking their course6 and us only trying to protect or to adapt ourselves.
In Men in Dark Times, Arendt (1955) writes: “What begins now, after the end of
world history, is the history of mankind” (p. 90). And she writes at the end of her es-
say “What is Authority?” (and repeats at the end of “The Crisis in Education”7) that
this means “to be confronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and
without the protection of traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behavior,
by the elementary problems of human living together” (p. 141). Assuming the history
of mankind, i.e. accepting that we are without sacred beginning and without destina-
tion and taking up the confrontation, means to ask and investigate how to make sense
again of such words as “freedom” or “authority”, how to conceive of education, culture,
etc. These are the excercises of thought that Arendt offers in her writings. It is a kind of
thinking that, as she writes, “is different from such mental processes as deducing, induc-
ing and drawing conclusions whose logical rules of non-contradiction and inner consist-
ency can be learned once and for all and then need only to be applied” (p. 14). Think-
ing is also not to interpret or to explain.8 It is exercises in thought, and “their only aim
is to gain experience in how to think; it does not contain prescriptions on what to think
or which truths to hold. Least of all do they intend to retie the broken thread of tradition
or to invent some newfangled surrogates with which to fill the gap between past and fu-
ture…The question is…about how to move in this gap” (p. 14). How to be present in/to
the present, how to see the present anew, how to deal with it, what to think of it, how to
relate to it and how to continue? These exercises are critical of traditional concepts, but
this critique is not intended to “debunk” (p. 14), i.e. to unmask or demystify them. Start-
ing from an acknowledgment that, in the strong sense, these concepts no longer mean
anything, that their meaning has been “evaporated”, leaving behind “empty shells”,
the challenge they present is rather “to distil from them anew their original spirit”
(p. 15).9 These exercises are to a large extent experiments, which “do not attempt to
design some sort of utopian future” (p. 14) or to provide definite solutions, but are
attempts to clarify some issues and to “gain some assurance in confronting specific
questions” (p. 15). These exercises are not part of an academic discipline, but rather
expressions of indiscipline. They arise out of the actuality of incidents, incidents of
lived experience (p. 14). Their literary form is that of the essay and the work that of an
experimenter (p. 15).The experience in thinking can only be won “in doing something”
6 “Hamm (anguished): What’s happening, what’s happening? Clov: Something is taking its
course” (Beckett, Endgame).
7 See her repeated statement that education “must proceed in a world that is neither structured
by authority nor held together by tradition” (Arendt, 1968, p. 195).
8 Arendt (1968) notes that philosophy is “unable to perform the task assigned to it by Hegel and
the philosophy of history, that is, to understand and grasp conceptually historical reality and
the events that made the modern world what it is” (p. 8).
9 With this idea of “original spirit”, Arendt does not refer to the origins of time or to suprasen-
sous ideas, but wants to try to relate these concepts to experiences connected to their inven-
tion. She is not falling back into some classic form of essentialism.
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(p. 14), yet as Arendt writes “we seem to be neither equipped nor prepared for this ac-
tivity of thinking, of settling down in the gap between past and future” (p. 13; italics
J. M). Thus, we have to look for equipment and preparation in order to elaborate our
experimental and attentive attitude towards the (educational) present, of which we our-
selves are part as far as we take up our insertion into time, i.e. as far as we take care of
ourselves (as subjects of action).
We have seen how Hannah Arendt conceives of her own work as “exercises in
thought” consisting mainly in “experiments”, “arising out of the actuality of incidents”,
and having the form of “essays” in which one’s presence in the present is at stake in
view of literally enlightening and clarifying that present, of moving in that present, and
of inspiring words with a renewed meaning (inspiring life in that present). Philosophy
(of education) thus understood as exercise can be educational in three senses. First, as a
kind of investigation or research that implies a bringing into play (putting to the test) of
the researcher herself, i.e. implying a self-education as “work on the self.” This work is
the necessary condition to gain insight into “the battlefield of forces”. But philosophy
as an essay is also a public gesture. Second, therefore, it is also educational in the sense
that it can have a meaning for others who are invited to share the experience and con-
stitute a public (i.e. they are invited to put themselves to the test and not to be taught).
And third, such philosophy can be educational in the sense that the present that is at
stake (and is investigated) is the educational present, the present of transformations of
educational institutions.
In order to further clarify what such (philosophy as) “exercises in/of thought”
entail(s) and what they require (in terms of equipment and preparation), I will now
briefly present a concrete and topical example of such an exercise.
3. Educational and philosophical research: the example of the Dardenne
brothers
As a concrete topical example of “philosophy of/as education” in all three senses men-
tioned above, I want to refer to the films made by the Belgian directors the Dardenne
brothers. It might seem strange to take films as an example, but there is no reason why
philosophy (and educational research) would only exist in a book, an article, or a lec-
ture, and not in film. However, it is neither my intention to incite philosophers of edu-
cation to stop writing and to make films, nor do I ignore the rich approaches within phi-
losophy of education, both in the continental and Anglo-Saxon traditions, that are try-
ing to move in the gap that Arendt refers to. There are those, for example, that were/are
engaged in trying to articulate an educational reality and present, rather than to criticize
it (e.g. the work by K. Mollenhauer, F. Bollnow, D. Benner, J. Larossa and others), or
those who are actually exploring other, more existential or experimental perspectives
(e.g. the work of R. Arcilla, D. Hansen, G. Biesta, M. Wimmer, N. Ricken, A. Schäfer,
Ch. Thompson, S. Ahrens, etc.). Rather, I want to add to these approaches within phi-
losophy of education, using the example of the Dardennes, in order: (1) to sharpen and
deepen the understanding of what an “exercise of thought” (i.e. philosophical work as
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educational, experimental work) could look like, especially today in the light of the
transformations of educational institutions related to deep changes in our social, techno-
logical, and cultural conditions; (2) to indicate more precisely what kind of work ethos
and what kind of requirements (in terms of “equipment and preparation”) such an exer-
cise entails; and (3), and most importantly, to clarify what is at stake in such an exercise,
what kind of relation towards the present, and towards ourselves in this present, is im-
plied, that is, how this present is approached and how it appears to us.
The feature films of Jean- Pierre and Luc Dardenne have all been made in a small
Belgian town that suffers deeply under the decline of old heavy industries. They can
be described as, what Cardullo (2009) terms, ‘commited cinema’. The directors have
amassed one of the most lauded bodies of work in contemporary world cinema (includ-
ing twice winning the Palme d’Or at the Cannes Film Festival). They investigate in an
intriguing way the contemporary reality of education10 and more particularly the actual
relationship between adolescents and adults (fathers, mothers, children, sons, daughters,
teachers, students, pupils,…). These films have been described by Héliot (2005) as an
“oeuvre d’apprentissage”, i.e. as a kind of “Bildungsfilm” – akin to the “Bildungsro-
man”. However their films are not really offering a narrative, rather, they show a “Bil-
dungsprozess”, which has no end (neither a happy nor a unhappy end), which is neither
teleologically determined nor governed by psychological or sociological laws or mecha-
nisms, but in which it is the dramatis personae that set reality in motion (they are “mo-
tion pictures” in more than one sense). Their films can be seen as empirical philosophi-
cal studies of essential educational situations and matters: What does it mean to be a
child, an adult, a father, a son, a mother, a daughter, a teacher, a schoolmaster, a pupil?
What does it mean, not in general, but in the concrete (and sometimes extreme) situa-
tions and conditions that society presents today? Their films investigate these questions
and they investigate whether and how answers can be/are given/found. In fact, as I will
elucidate, these films are showing us exercises of thought and are in the first place such
exercises in themselves.
When asked why they are fascinated by the relationship between adults and adolse-
cents the Dardenne brothers note that they are interested in what can still happen be-
tween parents/adults/teachers and children/sons/daughters/students:
This has to do, so they say, with the fact that the city in which we film is full of
families destroyed by the economic crisis, unemployement, drugs, where children
earn more money then their parents. People are more and more alone. When we first
worked on the script of La Promesse we also thought about an older character which
would have authority over the younger ones, but then we realised that this was nos-
talgic – there is no longer somebody who can be that authoritative voice. So we sim-
ply put them in a situation and asked the question: How are people today able to find
their way, alone and without help of the past? How to be human? (Andrew, 2006)
10 I refer to the five films Luc and Jean-Pierre Dardenne have made since the mid-nineties: La
Promesse (in 1996); Rosetta (1999; Winner, Palme d’Or, Cannes); Le Fils (2002); L’Enfant
(2005, Winner, Palme d’Or,,Cannes); Le Silence de Lorna (2008).
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Indeed, the Dardennes’ films ask these questions (How to live today? How to give the
words a meaning?) in a strong, fascinating, and penetrating way. And it is not difficult
to hear how this resounds with the questions and task Hannah Arendt raised: today we
are confronted again, without the protection by the past and the bridge of tradition, with
the question of human living together. And we can see how this question as a concrete
question “arising out of the actuality of incidents” (i.e. the actuality of a small town in
Belgium) and related to the personal experience of the filmmakers is nevertheless put
before us in such a way that it appears as a common question, the question that also in-
stalls a “we”. Their local anchoring does not prevent them from making a kind of “uni-
versal” or better, common film. On the contrary, the work of the Dardenne brothers in-
vestigates this question of human living together in a way that makes it also become
“our” question, the question of the spectators. They invite us to be attentive, to see, and
listen, and to think. They make us so to speak into a public; they gather us around this
question and what is at stake in it; they also put us to the test (How to find one’s way?
How to act in a right way? What does it mean to be a father, etc.?).
What interests me here more particularly is: How do they arrive at this? What do
they actually do? What kind of ethos is implied?
First of all they investigate the question as a radically open question. They investi-
gate not as gatekeepers of the truth (or speaking in the name of humanity or whomever),
but as truth seekers themselves, trying to find out (by way of their film making) how to
move in the gap between past and future, how to think i.e. working on an ethos of in-
vestigation and filming, including all kinds of preparation and equipment (I will return
to this later). The fact that these films are imbued with ethical-philosophical and educa-
tional questions does not turn them into a moralising cinema. On the contrary, they give
no easy answers and are not preaching any morality. They do not judge: they prove or
explain/explicate nothing. Of course, the films do have a frame and are framing, and this
frame marks a space, but the space is no interior, no home. Rather it is a kind of space of
“exposition”, of being exposed to things (happenings) that become exposed.
Their films do not proclaim or defend any truth; they are not an expression of a doc-
trine, theory, or conviction. But in their films there is a truth that shows itself in what is
happening before the camera. Their camera registers the truth of the words and deeds of
the protagonists, a truth that shows itself to us and that manifests itself in an almost in-
escapable way. As one commentator wrote:
For many people cinema, books, radio, newspapers, journals, politics, even their
own family is but a folding screen. Not only to hide from view death, but to hide
from view almost everything. Your films pull down the screen and not everyone
likes that…Whatever reality is described, stories always confer glamour to the de-
scribed reality. Filmed stories do that even more than written ones…You appar-
ently film without commentary (and without story). I cannot remember having seen
films which are so objective, so purely registrating as yours. What makes your films
so special is the apparent absence of rhetorics. That makes them sometimes also
unbearable. Since rhetorics in films and books softens or attenuates: they indicate
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something about the maker and how the work has been made; it offers the spectator
the occasion to think: this is bad or terrible, but beautiful. You don’t offer the spec-
tator this softening thought of ‘this is beautiful’, this possibility to feel distance to-
wards the described reality and to look at it with the ironic gaze of the distinguished
art expert. (Grunberg, 2008; italics J. M.)
In this context I would state that this cinema is in fact a very strong form of empirical
research or, better, of empirical philosophy. Further, it may be one of the most impor-
tant, advanced, and needed forms. One which neither judges nor only observes facts and
then makes them known, but one which clarifies or enlightens a(n) (educational) real-
ity. One that makes that which is observed also “speak”, we might say, or maybe better,
become “real”, something that “works”11 and that offers “experience” and, thus, starts
to partake in our world (and that is the strong sense of “empirical”). In a way, then, we
could argue that the Dardennes show us how, in a world of images, fiction becomes
necessary to offer an experience of (the) world, of reality. Or, as Deleuze noted: if the
world has turned into a bad movie, an inflation of images, clichés, and simulacra, “au-
thentic” cinema could make us believe again in the world (Deleuze, 1989, p. 181). The
Dardennes’ films enlighten, not in the sense that they explain or teach us a lesson, but
in the sense that they offer an insight into the forces that are operating, that they clarify
an issue and, to use the words of Robert Bresson one of their ‘movie fathers’, that they
make appear (disclose) what without them would not appear (Bresson, 1988, p. 82).
This is not a revealing of what is underlying or presupposed or invisible, but a disclosing
of what in a certain way is enclosed in our present. “Appearing” here has to be taken in
the strong sense: they present us with reality,12 make it real, make it start to take part in/
be part of our world. The real is not what is simply given – and as such would appear as
object of knowledge – but what comes to appear in an experience where it is not simply
an object but starts to live, to communicate. And one of the reasons that the Dardennes
can do this is because the filmmakers themselves are present in these films in the sense
that they are for themselves real exercises in thought with all the attachment (that is an
intimate relationship) and exposition (and one could call this indeed “authentic” as De-
leuze suggests) that this entails.
In an interview, J.-P. Dardenne says:
Our documentaries were hieratic or pastoral. [Indeed before they made feature films,
they made documentaries in the 1970s and 1980s]. The word had the central role,
11 In German as in Dutch “Wirklichkeit” or “werkelijkheid” (reality) have this connotation of
being a work and at work. In this sense the English “reality” could be understood as offering
a “thing” a res in the sense of res publica (see Latour, 2005).
12 Although I am aware of the potentially problematic use of the term “reality” (and “immedi-
ate”), I don’t want to engage in an epistemological debate here. “Real” does not refer here
to some kind of “state of affairs” that we would or could know “directly”, but to a certain
“work” (some-thing-that-works), to something that is the work of “res”, a “thing” in the way
that, for example, Heidegger and later Latour used this term.
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and the film served only as a ‘mise-en-scène’ of a testimony. Situations, places, ac-
tions were shown to sustain what was told in the story. In our documentaries the
event or happening always laid in the past. It was re-told. In La Promesse this dwell-
ing on words, ‘cette mise-en-scène posée’, is replaced by the im-mediate present of
events/happenings. The camera cannot choose a location that was thought of before-
hand, the camera (together with us) also registrates for the first time what happens,
without making a detour along an organising (ordering) reason. In La Promesse the
camera registrates direct environments. (Verstraeten & Reynders, 1999, p. 54-55;
translation J. M.).
The directors use a handheld camera, a camera that surprises and captures at the same
time. The way that they film makes clear that the camera does not know what is going
to happen. “The camera must show reality, without offering commentary. We transmit
happenings, sometimes confusing, sometimes violent, and the camera should behave as
we do: just too late to be able to react to what happens” (Verstraeten & Reynders, 1999,
p. 54-55). The Dardenne brothers, thus, show us in a radical way film and not a scena-
rio. They don’t want to announce or name, define something before we (and they!) have
seen it. They are not defining what happens, as is the old philosophical dream, dreamt
by analytical philosophy, they are not contextualising or historicising it as is the dream
of hermeneutics, they are not deconstructing it as postmodern philosophy aspires to, but
they attempt to show the happenings as “actions”, i.e. as happenings in the gap between
past and future, as experiments and attempts that start from the acceptance of one’s in-
sertion in time. They start from the protagonists themselves who try to find out what it
means to be a teacher, father, son, mother, etc. and put things in motion.
Indeed, and most importantly, the films remind us that “action” is possible. They
show how psychological, sociological, historical laws and forces are suspended and
how the words “father”, “teacher”, “mother”, etc. could begin to mean something new.13
Their films don’t show us much of the (personal, social) circumstances of the characters
they stage. They don’t focus on context or do not reveal mechanisms (for example, of
revenge) in which the protagonists would be captured or which would determine their
lives and living together. Rather, they offer studies of the ability to act and speak, to be-
gin anew, to break the law of social, psychological, historical gravity. The films show an
insertion in the continuum of time, a gap between past and future, and are themselves
trying to move in such a gap, testifying to such insertion (that is also why they are able
to offer us an insight into the “forces” that are at work, to use the words of Arendt).
Therefore in their films the Dardennes do not start from a plot or story (which would be
there/in place before the protagonists themselves and would take them along, as would
13 They show how to escape social, historical, psychological, laws and processes; how to not
simply repeat social, historical, psychological “definitions” of what it means to be a father,
etc. For example, in La Promesse: how can the boy escape the process started by the criminal
father and be a son in another way? In Rosetta: how can Rosetta take a distance from her al-
cohol addicted mother and be a daugther in another way? In Le Fils: how can the father of a
murdered son escape the circle of revenge and be a “father” in another way?
364 Beiträge
laws or habits), but from the protagonists and situations, i.e. they engage in a certain re-
lation to what happens in the present.
Every “given” is first submitted to the test of film itself: naked presence and dura-
tion (it is as if the words and deeds, the gestures, appear as such, on their own, as “empty
shells” that at the same moment start to gain meaning again). Only afterwards can we
assign the fragments a place in the course of events. Because of their fascination with
the sudden illumination of moments, the Dardennes often make us wait minutes be-
fore we grasp something of the meaning of a scene. But this meaning does not refer to
a story, but to a protagonist (personage) and a situation. Their cinema does not tell sto-
ries, it does not narrate, but registers. As Luc Dardenne notes, refering to Rosetta: “To
narrate impedes or obstructs existence…[T]he less one tells about a persona, the more it
exists…Rather than narrating, we have tried to find the gestures which were essential to
the character” (Sartor, 2001, p. 15; italics and translation J. M.). The story (history) does
not precede the characters, but is organised around them and starting from them. It is the
characters, their gestures and movements, and their words, that offer the starting point,
and not the plot. The films, therefore, have no clear beginning or end. They have no his-
tory that explains the actions we see (which does not imply that history and context have
no meaning). The characters are there (and it is important that they are there – present to
the situation, and not absent, distracted, immunized); the camera registers what they do
or do not do and this is more important than who they are and what will happen.14 This
happening is also shown as fragments from a journey (“un parcours”) and not of a dis-
course (“un discours”). Very often, we as spectators are set in a situation and only gradu-
ally can we find out why the characters act as they do. Luc Dardenne notes:
This is to avoid explaining to the spectator that the mother of this character did this
and that and that that is the reason why she acts as she acts. If you do that, the char-
acter stops living. This is why in mainstream cinema, when you explain why char-
acters are behaving in a certain way, the public understands this explanation, but in
fact has understood nothing. We want the spectators of our films to not be able to ex-
plain where the characters are coming from, and why they behave in such and such
a way, but they will be able to see that these characters are able to deal with the situ-
ation. (Sartor, 2001, p. 15)
They are able to act, to begin! The Dardennes do not only make clear that and how to-
day fiction is necessary to make something appear as “real”, but also to make appear
the possibility to act, or to show the truth of action as the possibility to begin (or poten-
14 As Luc Dardenne (2005) writes: “L’acteur n’a pas une ‘intériorité’ qu’il pourrait vouloir
exprimer. Devant la caméra il est là, il se comporte…Il doit s’abstraire de toute volonté et
rejoindre l’involontaire…Nos indications aux acteurs sont physiques et la plupart du temps
négatives pour les arrêter chaque fois que nous sentons qu’ils sortent du comportement qu’ils
ont pour la caméra. Enregistrant ce comportement, la caméra pourra enregistrer l’apparition
de regards et de corps plus intérieurs que toute intériorité exprimée par le jeu des acteurs. Pour
la caméra, les acteurs sont des révélateurs, pas des constructeurs. Ce qui demande beaucoup
de travail” (p. 106; italics J. M.).
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tiality), and to gather us (as a public) around such questions as: What does it mean to be
father, son, teacher, mother … today?
To put it in a more general way, the Dardennes are doing this: trying the words
(teacher, student, father, son, mother, daughter, adult, child,…), trying the verbs (edu-
cating, teaching, speaking,…) once again where “things are taking their course”. They
interrupt the course and open a space of practical freedom. This may be another way to
formulate what “authentic cinema”, in the words of Deleuze, is able to do, and to indi-
cate in what sense it might be called educational without “teaching” us something. And
that is why their cinema is not only a very realistic, hard, and terrifying cinema, but also
an essentially optimistic cinema. Something takes its course, but you can try to make
the present present, i.e. to present the gap between past and future and to present exam-
ples of how to move in this gap, offering a kind of happines and hope, but it is a pure
hope, without foundation and guarantee, without destination/end (accepting that there
is no sacred beginning and no destination in the words of Arendt), and is therefore a
specifically pure (human) hope. Their films do not only offer us documents (and narra-
tives), nor do they simply illustrate or tell or explain, but they enlighten our educational
present and bring it into play. They are not only offering us something to see. There is
something to see (and they discover it with us and we with them), but also this seeing
is precisely a way to make us think, to engage us (they offer us philosophical, ethical,
educational questions as existential questions), and to inspire us. Or better, they offer us
a “seeing for the first time”, which makes us think again. It is not that they would offer
us a social reality in its crudity or try to go “directly” or “immediately” to the truth, but
that a certain aesthetics (of the realistic genre) obliges us to take part in a (sensory) ex-
perience. (See also Rancière, 1999; Prédal, 2005). Inventing a new (image) language,
using particular equipment and preparations, they show the complexity of reality, its un-
predictable course, but also the space of thought (the present as a gap) in which they in-
vite us as in a kind of “collective experiment”, to use the words of Bruno Latour (2004).
Taking up the words of Arendt, these films are “essays” and experiments. They are
not thought experiments, however, but experiments in/of thought, the experiment be-
ing precisely the exposition of what one thinks and is (What kind of subject? e.g. father
etc.). And therefore their truth-telling is a truth-telling that comes out of a sense of ur-
gency and is one in which the authors are present. If it works, then the reader or specta-
tor is offered not only an insight but also an experience, and this experience is also an
experience of freedom, a freedom with regard to the way things “take their course” (as
“sempiternal change” in Arendt’s words). She does not have to accept what is written
or shown, or even believe it, but when witnessing this not-indifferent writing or film-
ing, she can partake (or feel invited to partake) in the risk of discourse and of a usage
(of words and verbs) that is not assured, disciplined, and safe (immunized). She might
be reminded of her own difficulty by the way the films are written or made, and the way
their authors are present in it and, therefore, could be ready to engage.
The cinema of the Dardenne brothers offers us an example of a way of doing research
in which all kinds of devices and preparations are used, implying particular ways to live
their own lives and to live together and work together out of passion or love for the truth
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and curiosity towards the present. These devices and preparations, invented throughout
the years (see further), and a continued experimental ethos and attentive attitude constitute
together the conditions for speaking the truth and for letting truth appear or finding a way
to move in the gap. Moreover, their films tell a truth in such a way that it becomes diffi-
cult not to be concerned, and for that reason they can bring us to put ourselves to the test.
4. Setting up laboratories, experiments, and fieldwork
The work of the Dardennes can be regarded as an example or paradigm of philosophy
of education. It is “educational research”, not only as research on education, revealing
something or offering knowledge about our educational present, but as an exercise of
thought, making a public gesture, inviting us to think i.e. to put us to the test. Such phi-
losophy of education is not an academic discipline, but rather a kind of indiscipline. It
involves (1) taking up the questions: What does it mean to be an adult, a child, a father,
a son, a teacher, a student, etc. today?; What does it mean to live a human life today?;
What is education?; What is a school?; What is a university?; What is teaching? etc. It
involves (2) trying to make these questions into “our” questions, questions that put me
and us to the test, common questions i.e. to make them public and gather a public around
them. Philosophy of education, then, is to try the words and the verbs again, to expose
them so that they can start again to mean something or to speak (Masschelein 2011).
Therefore, I think it is helpful to conceive of the site of such a philosophy of educa-
tion as a laboratory or workshop (rather than a ‘center’ or ‘institute’) and to conceive of
its practice in terms of experimentation,15 exercise, fieldwork,16 or attempts (essays).17
Deriving from the Latin laborare, the term laboratory was used, according to the La-
rousse Dictionary, for the place where chemical composites where produced, and also
for the place of study and, until the 18th century for the workshop of painters and sculp-
tors. It can be conceived, then, as a space organised and operating as an experimental
system that should allow for (new) things to happen, to appear as such, to make them
‘public’, or make them present, emphasizing the practice of making as trying to call into
15 See e.g. Deligny (1976). For a fascinating and inspiring analysis of the meaning of the experi-
ment to rethink ‘Bildung’ and educational philosophy and theory, relying partly on the work
of H. J. Rheinberger, see Ahrens (2011).
16 The term ‘fieldwork’ in philosophy is a term used also by P. Rabinow and N. Rose in their
introduction to the ‘Essential Foucault’, to distinguish Foucault’s use of “exercise” from that
found in philosophy or social theory of the traditional sort. They talk about a certain ethos
of investigation (and not about a methodology) implying detailed and meticulous labour, a
movement of thought that invents, makes use of, and modifies conceptual tools as they are
set into a relation with specific practices and problems, which they themselves help to form
in new ways. According to them, the question for Foucault was whether it was “possible to
develop a kind of critical thought that would not judge – so much criticism has the form of a
quasi-judicial tribunal passing down verdicts of guilt or innocence on persons or events – but
would create, produce, intensify the possibilities within existence. And this, perhaps, is the
challenge which his work lays down to us today” (Rabinow & Rose, 2003, p. 18). It is a form
of work that is articulated also as “empirical philosophy” (Mol, 2000).
17 See e.g. Thompson (2009).
Masschelein: Inciting an attentive experimental ethos and creating a laboratory setting … 367
presence (or, as Bresson suggests: to make appear what would not appear without this
practice). In this line, and using the words of Arendt, we could say that in order to take
up the questions and try the words and verbs again we need “equipment” (devices and
protocols) and “preparations”. These should help us to become attentive (to be present
in the present), to expose ourselves, to develop (based on an intimate relationship) an
experimental stance and to make things appear and become public. A laboratory, then, is
the habitat (including equipment, devices, preparations, ways of living or working, etc.)
that offers the conditions for the development of a philosophical ethos as an attentive
and experimental ethos, and for capturing, in a certain sense, what is happening today.
Let us take some suggestions for this habitat and, in particular, its equipment and
preparations and for how to proceed, i.e. the attentive and experimental ethos, from the
Dardennes themselves. For them, making films is the art of representing nothing with
images – signifying nothing (Rotman, 1987) – but making something able to appear and
become some thing (something that concerns us, and starts to signify or to speak) that
would not appear without their work. They have no clear objective they aim at, no mes-
sage they want to convey, but they ask themselves what is ‘human’ in present day condi-
tions? To make appear what happens to humanity, they put people (actors) in a situation
before the camera in order to see and to capture what happens. They establish an experi-
mental condition, starting from an ethos of investigation and questioning that combines
a thorough preparation with a certain poverty or self-indulged limitation of means, in
order to arrive at an attentive attitude. Because they do not really know what they are
looking for (they hope it will happen before the camera), their way of working cannot
be conceived strictly as a method. Rather they organise an occasion based on a protocol
that offers a certain chance that something will appear and communicate, that something
will be disclosed. A protocol is a clear guideline, which one follows time and again, but
that has no clear ‘end’, no destination. It is a kind of ‘way’ that leads nowhere; it is like
a cut that opens onto a world. Going this way is not about realising one’s intentions or
responding to one’s expectations, but is a way that implies repetition and mechanical
regularity without ‘meaning’, precisely to de-centre our intentions. As Bresson (1998)
writes: “Cela parcequ’une mécanique fait surgir l’inconnu, et non parcequ’on a trouvé
d’avance cet inconnu” (p. 70). The protocol helps to suspend too-familiar stories; it cuts
the illusion of some “pure genius”. The Dardennes make use of devices (handcamera,
particular locations, particular costumes, etc…) and refuse a certain comfort in order to
displace themselves and, in a way, to defamiliarize themselves, to make themselves into
strangers. They rely on a particular discipline of the body and the mind, they refuse to
interpret and to explain the present, they avoid contextualising and historicizing. Rather
they try to “cut” into the present and to penetrate it by producing it (making fiction –
factum in Latin). They are not so much trying to understand, grasp, know, and tell sto-
ries, but trying to think, to articulate, to enlighten, and to “make” or add things.
Talking about their “protocol” they refer to the constraints they place on themselves.
First of all, there are spatial constraints: they cut out some parts of the world and use
existing physical spaces to create a scenario. This constraint is accompanied by a self-
imposed poverty of financial and technical means. Their work is not to realise, start-
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ing from a clear story, as almighty directors, the mise-en-scène which could be dreamt
off, but to create out of some intuitions and questions a situation in which something
could happen. This implies arranging the situation in such a way that, far from every-
thing being possible, in fact very little is possible (e.g. the spaces are often so small and
defined that the camera men are very limited in the positions they can take; they don’t
use découpage; the dialogues are almost completely fixed on beforehand; they only use
one kind of lens, etc.). Their preparation and the preparations of the actors are very long
and thorough, so that they increase their own acquaintance (or intimacy) with the situa-
tion as much as possible. They exhaust their actors in order to make them abandon their
intentions and refrain from “expressing” some interiority, so that they just “act” in the
situation. This requires a lot of work, as Luc Dardenne (2005) writes: “Ce qui demande
beaucoup de travail” (p. 106).
To create a laboratory, then, requires work to be done. This work is, to a large ex-
tent, work on the self, implying also work that enables something to appear, that makes
something present, that catches something of what is happening, and enables us to dis-
miss our reflections. (Bresson: “Il ne s’agit pas de diriger quelqu’un, mais de se diriger
soi-même” Bresson, 1988, p. 16) A laboratory is a place to perform experiments and to
create experiences, it is a place to study and to expose oneself. Like the Dardennes, by
accepting (rather then judging) our educational present, we could maybe look for new
ways, equipment, procedures, and devices in order, as Bergson said, not to see what
we think, but to think what we see, to expose our thinking to what is happening (to the
present), and to get beyond our own reflections, to break them. This asks for an art of
being “there”, that changes a there into a “here”. (This is what is involved in what we
call fieldwork). In order to see, in order to put oneself to the test of educational “real-
ity”, the laboratory is therefore also a place of registration. It develops the equipment
to “see” something; that is, it employs devices to make present (to “fictionalize”) and to
register that present. To take up what is suggested by the work of the Dardennes, and to
say that the laboratory is a place of exposition and registration, means that such work is
about a way of doing that refrains from activities of judgment and gatekeeping (ques-
tions have to be really open questions), that defers or suspends definitions (and discipli-
nations), explanations, interpretations, contextualisations, deconstructions, or historici-
sations, and that in a way “makes fiction”. In this sense, we can think of further devel-
oping this art as an art of making things public (to literally articulate the questions) and
to gather a public around the questions of our educational present. Making things public
(as matters of public concern) is thus the result of work on the self that breaks open the
common horizon of our self-understanding (“things taking their course”) and taken for
granted practices (that is, what “we” regard as “matters of fact”), and hence transforms
them into matters of concern. This kind of research is an attempt to go beyond the dis-
tinction between empirical and conceptual, and in which the very act of investigating
one’s present puts, at the same time, the (existential-ethical) position of the researcher
at stake (See Masschelein & Simons, 2008). This kind of research, taking up the experi-
mental attitude and providing experimental knowledge, would then take place in a la-
boratory where “work on the self” is at stake. Such a laboratory would have a particular
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public function. Or more precisely, this workshop or laboratory would itself be a public
space because the main focus is not on matters of fact (waiting there for the researcher
to study them) but on matters of concern generated/produced by existential-ethical work
and by making fiction that generates a public (gesture).
To summarize: the work of philosophy of education, then, is to make us think by mak-
ing things public; it is exercises of thought. It is about registring, seeing, illuminating,
bringing into play, penetrating, inviting, inspiring, experimenting; it is about exposing
oneself and trying the words and verbs again. I did, in the end, not really address the
“transformation” of educational institutions. Nor did I go into the various attempts made
today to deal with them by trying to explain and judge them. I think that what is im-
portant today is to make the questions – “What is education?”, “What is adulthood?”;
“What is a child?”; “What is a university?”; “What is a school?”; “What is a family?”;
“What is an asylum?”; “What is a teacher?”; “What is a student?” etc. – once more into
real questions i.e. into matters of concern (matters that make us think), and into “com-
mon” things or public things, ,res publica. This implies that these “what” questions are
not questions seeking definitions or atemporal essences, but are open, existential ques-
tions asking what it could mean to educate, to be an adult, etc., that reinvent their mean-
ing, for reinventing a truly human life.
Things take their course, transformations are taking place, and all kinds of forces are
at work (Simons & Masschelein, 2008). Maybe it is important not to forget oneself as
the point where and through which the forces work, and where and through which “in-
sight in the game of forces that constitute our existence” (Faust, 382-84) can be gained,
but also where and through which they are split up and broken, where and through
which they are cut. That is why laboratories and fieldwork could be useful, to put our-
selves to the test of contemporary reality.
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